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1 Many philosophers hold a double standard when it comes to the normative standing of
doubt  and  belief.  While  they  regard  “believing  at  will”  to  be  both  impossible  and
irrational, they often find “doubting at will,” by contrast, to be highly rewarding for any
form of rational inquiry. In particular, they take it to be our moral obligation not only to
question but also to suspend or discard those intellectual inclinations that cannot be
“rationally grounded” – whether or not we can entertain any real doubt about them, and
regardless of how irresistible they may appear.
2 According  to  an  influential  view,1 such  “acritical”  beliefs  may  not  even be  properly
classified  as  beliefs.  This  is  because  genuine  beliefs  are  thought  to  be  essentially
responsive to experiential  input,  which they can only be,  according to this  view,  by
regulating their behavioral output on the basis of clearly identifiable grounds. This is what
makes  them  inherently  normative  even  as  they  remain  fallible;  as  opposed  to  our
“uncontrollable” judgments, whose seemingly normative implications we can and ought to
suspend. In what follows, I will introduce and elaborate on some aspects of C. S. Peirce’s
pragmatism in order to articulate an alternative conception of belief.
3 Peirce’s  opposition  to  Descartes’  method  of  hyperbolic  doubt  reflects  the  former’s
conviction that, given the practical nature of a concept’s meaningful implications, inquiry
should begin from doubts that are actually capable of disrupting our otherwise settled
practical inclinations (which include inclinations governing theoretical inquiry, of course).
If, as we shall see, the sole purpose of inquiry is the fixation of belief, there is no point in
trying to “fix” habits of mind that are in fact already settled.2 At the same time, it seems
as if Peirce was not always willing to embrace such a thoroughly pragmatic conception of
inquiry. Not only he went so far as to claim that “beliefs,” regarded as dispositions upon
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which  we  are  ready to  act  in  everyday  life,  should  not  play  any  normative  role  in
theoretical inquiry.3 He also constantly emphasized the risk of regarding as true whatever
we find ourselves irresistibly inclined to believe by pointing to the fleeting nature of many
such irresistible, so-called “self-evident” beliefs. Thus, in the well-known essay in which
he introduced his conception of inquiry, Peirce also criticized the “a priori” method for
the fixation of belief: the idea that, in contrast to both the methods of “tenacity” and
“authority,” we ought to reason on the basis of our natural ways of thinking or “inward
light of reason,” as this is expressed by our duly considered feelings and inclinations.
4 The foregoing tension can be brought out with respect to the relationship between truth
and conceivability. On the one hand, as I have already mentioned, Pierce was critical of
the Cartesian requirement  according to  which inquiry should only  begin from those
propositions which we cannot conceivably doubt. Inquiry does and should, in addition,
rely upon all those beliefs about which we do not entertain any genuine doubt. On the
other hand, Peirce did not regard our incapacity to cast genuine doubts on any given
belief as an indication of its validity.  The inconceivability of a proposition’s negation
cannot be, in and of itself, a valid criterion for endorsing that proposition. As a criterion or
method of inquiry,4 the “test of inconceivability” is not only unreliable but also highly
deceptive.
If  we  cannot  already  imagine  any  way  in  which  a  proposition  would  be  false,
neither can we yet imagine any way of imagining it to be false. But for all that, the
simplest little suggestion or information may at any moment put it into our power
to imagine what no effort of thought could before enable us to imagine. (CP 2.30)
5 For instance, one could find it impossible to deny that a whole is greater than any one of
its parts. And yet, as in the case of Columbus’ egg, it takes a quite simple suggestion to
realize that while the collection of even numbers is only one part of the entire collection
of integers, the former is as great as the latter. “For every integer number there is a
separate and distinct double; and thus the doubles are as many as the integer numbers.
But these doubles are all even numbers; and so, the partial collection is as great as the
whole collection.” (CP 2.30).5
6 As a consequence, Peirce appeared ambivalent with respect to the degree of trust we
should confer upon our intuitive judgments and natural inferences. There is indeed an
interesting  however  rarely  noted  tension  between  Peirce’s  pragmatic  conception  of
reasoning and his rejection of psychologism and the a priori method. In what follows, I
argue that Peirce’s “Critical common-sensism” is an attempt to resolve this tension by
arguing  that  we  should  neither  conclusively  accept  nor  discard  our  “acritically
indubitable” intellectual dispositions. Rather we must unreservedly rely on them for the
sake of engaging in any form of rational inquiry.6 This is because, whether or not they are
in  fact  (entirely)  “true,”  such  dispositions  provide  us  with  the  conceptual  means  to
articulate both the very idea of rational inquiry and the opportunities of engaging in its
pursuit. If, whenever you inquire into something, you have a general sense of what you
are up to, this is because, insofar as you reason at all, you are striving to achieve that kind
of intellectual stability (“fixation”) which is already vaguely provided by that “immense
mass of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself […] and who knows
whether, if you could, you would not have made all knowledge impossible to yourself?”
(EP2: 336).
7 Now, if deliberate reasoning aims at a thorough settlement of belief, this is because the
aim  of  fixation  is  “constitutive”  of  belief  itself,  or  intrinsic  to  its  natural  telos.
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Accordingly, the bulk of this essay (sections 4-6) consists in a defense of the claim that
cognitive stability is the constitutive aim of believing something to be the case – and that
“truth”  can be  regarded as  partaking  of  such an aim only  by  expressing  that  more
fundamental claim. More precisely, my thesis is that whenever you believe a proposition
(or in order to believe it),  you regard is as true with the aim of thereby accepting a
thoroughly stable opinion.7
8 But if fixation is the constitutive aim of belief, our acritically indubitable judgments and
inferences8 can be regarded as genuine beliefs.  Consequently, our inability to become
aware of  a  belief’s  rational  grounds is  not  by itself  a  sufficient  reason to discard its
meaningful  implications.  Before  arguing  for  this  conclusion,  however,  we  must
understand more precisely how acritically indubitable beliefs emerge and what role do
they play in practical reasoning (sections 2-3).
 
2. Pragmatism and Self-Control
9 Peirce thought of pragmatism as a “method of reflexion” based upon an investigation of
the  phenomena of  self-control.  At  the  same time,  he argued that  “Critical  common-
sensism” is  a  necessary  “consequence”  of  Pragmatism.  These  claims  are  importantly
connected and can be best understood in light of each other. 
10 “Critical  common-sensism”  consists  in  the  claim  that  there  are  widely  endorsed
“propositions and inferences” which resemble perceptual judgments in being “acritical”
(non deliberate or self-controlled), our non-intellectual dispositions in being “instinctive”
(see EP2: 346-54), and our deepest insights in being “invariably vague.” By contrast, the
pragmatic maxim requires us to clarify the meaning of a proposition p by looking at its
implications for self-controlled conduct, namely, by determining how I ought to act if I
were to believe that  p.  Among such implications,  there is  the fact  that  rational  self-
control eventually comes to an end in judgments and inferences we cannot help acting
upon (which include but are not limited to our perceptual judgments). Such “acritically
indubitable” beliefs can thus be regarded at once as deriving from (“consequences” of) a
concept’s  pragmatic  clarification  and  a  legitimate  basis  for  inquiry’s  further
developments.9 This is the sense in which, according to Peirce, the pragmatic method of
inquiry  entails  high  respect  for  our  intuitive  or  commonsensical  judgments  and
inferences. In this section I will elaborate upon this connection between self-control and
common sense in light of Peirce’s conception of reasoning.
11 Writes Peirce in 1905: 
The term ‘reasoning’ ought to be confined to such fixation of one belief by another
as is reasonable, deliberate, self-controlled. A reasoning must be conscious; and this
consciousness  is  not  mere  ‘immediate  consciousness’  […]  but  is  in  its  ultimate
nature  (meaning  in  that  characteristic  element  of  it  that  is  not  reducible  to
anything simpler), a sense of taking a habit, or disposition to respond to a given
kind of stimulus in a given kind of way. (5.540)
12 This conception of reasoning reflects the irreducible law-like generality involved in any
rationally self-controlled resolution to think or act in one way or another – conversely, it
points to what makes it impossible for us to understand any symbolic expression without
taking up, consolidating, or modifying a habit of conduct.
13 Yet, Peirce continues, “the secret of rational consciousness is not so much to be sought in
the study of this one peculiar nucleolus,” namely self-conscious habit change, “as in the
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review of the process of self-control in its entirety” (EP2: 347). Given the density of the
text in which it occurs, this passage could be understood in different ways. However,
important  clues  are  provided by what  immediately  follows it.  After  emphasizing the
importance of imagination for the formation of habits, and its greater role in “logical”
than “moral” self-control, Peirce writes: “Certain obvious features of the phenomena of
self-control (and especially of habit) can be expressed compactly […] by saying that we
have an occult nature of which and of its contents we can only judge by the conduct that
it determines.” And to emphasize that he is talking of self-controlled conduct, Peirce adds:
“According to the maxim of Pragmaticism, to say that determination affects our occult
nature is to say that it is capable of affecting deliberate conduct […]” (EP2: 347, emphasis
added).10 Now, what makes conduct deliberate?
14 As Peirce notes in the fifth of his 1903 Harvard lectures, since any rational inference
involves a “qualitative approval” of the general class of arguments to which the inference
belongs, it is our consciousness of the specific character of such an approval that makes the
inference fully deliberate – even though we may not be able to resist our inclination to
approve it. Accordingly, in 1905 Peirce writes that the pragmatic maxim “requires that in
reasoning we should be conscious,  not  only of  the conclusion,  and of  our deliberate
approval of it, but also of its being the result of the premiss from which it does result, and
furthermore that the inference is one of a possible class of inferences which conform to
one guiding principle” (EP2: 348). Insofar as we are aware of the general guiding principle
which  guides  our  inferences,  the  latter  can  be  rightly  said  to  belong  to  a  chain  of
deliberate or self-controlled reasoning. However, Peirce continues:
There are […] cases in which we are conscious that a belief has been determined by
another  given  belief,  but  are  not  conscious  that  it  proceeds  on  any  general
principle. Such is St. Augustine’s ‘cogito, ergo sum.’ Such a process should be called,
not a reasoning but an acritical inference. Again, there are cases in which one belief
is determined by another,  without our being at all  aware of it.  These should be
called associational suggestions of belief. (EP2: 348)11
15 Presumably, then, a review of “the process of self-control in its entirety” should include a
reflection on the nature and function of such non-thoroughly transparent inferences and
beliefs.
16 To begin with, one might find Peirce’s classification of Augustine’s mode of inference
inaccurate.  I  agree  with  Peirce’s  implicit  assumption  that  Descartes’  well-known
inference is but a generalization of Augustine’s “Si fallor, sum.”12 But the latter does seem
to be based on a deliberate (self-conscious) mode of reasoning. As Augustine writes in his
treatise on the theological virtues: “by not positively affirming that they are alive, the
skeptics ward off the appearance of error in themselves, yet they do make errors simply
by showing themselves alive; one cannot err who is not alive. That we live is therefore not
only  true,  but  it  is  altogether  certain  as  well.”  The  general  guiding  principle  which
governs the foregoing inference can be roughly formulated as follows: nobody can doubt
a proposition whose truth must be presupposed by any attempt to deny it. That is, if (by
reductio) I was mistaken in believing that I am alive, I would still be shown to be alive by
the fact that I am mistaken. Whence it follows that I cannot be mistaken about the fact
that I am alive. 
17 Then why does Peirce claim that  Augustine’s  inference is  “acritical,”  namely,  one in
which “we are conscious that a belief has been determined by another given belief, but
are not conscious that it proceeds on any general principle”? Peirce’s thought, I contend,
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might point to the fact that the rational strength of Augustine’s inference does not depend
on any self-conscious guiding principle. Not only we may be unaware of any relevant
principle governing the inference “si fallor, sum” in the act of drawing it, but also our
subsequent justification might be less a description of our rational motivation for making
that  inference  than an  ad  hoc  rationalization.  And yet  our  lack  of  awareness  of  the
relevant guiding principle does not undermine the rational validity of the inference –
even though it does diminish the degree of self-control under which it can be performed.
By contrast when I say, “The ground is wet; it must have rained,” the rational validity of
this inference  does  seem  to  depend  on  the  vague  apprehension  of  a  more  general
principle, such as that every event must have a cause.
18 Augustine  questioned  the  sincerity  of  those  people  (the  “Academics”)  who  wonder
“whether a wise man should ever affirm anything positively lest he be involved in the
error of  affirming as true what may be false.” The problem with such an “agnostic”
approach could be expressed as follows. On the one hand, it legitimizes radical skepticism
as a kind of default epistemological position against which all our criteria ought ideally to
be measured. By so doing, it sets a standard that is widely found impossible to meet. On
the other hand, the standard itself is not as innocent as it appears, at least insofar as it
conflates the question of the normative standing of an inference with the question about
the degree of self-control under which it can be performed (the kind of intellectual self-
control which would be undermined by not doubting those beliefs, however inescapable,
that cannot be rationally grounded). As a consequence it misrepresents, not so much that
“particular nucleolus” (and highest expression) of deliberative rationality which consists
in the possibility of drawing self-consciously guided rational inferences, as “the process
of self-control regarded in its entirety” – namely, regarded from the broader perspective
which includes the emergence of self-controlled inquiry from, and its gradual fulfillment
toward, what is beyond our power to control.
19 Of course, “control may itself be controlled, criticism itself subjected to criticism; and
ideally there is no obvious definite limit to the sequence.” And now it seems as if we were
stuck between the horns of the dilemma: either there is no rationally acceptable limit to
the regress, or such a limit could only be found in a combination of (something like)
“sense impressions” and “self-evident” or a priori guiding principles. Peirce rejects this
dilemma: 
If one seriously inquiries whether it is possible that a completed series of actual
efforts should have been endless or beginningless […] I think he can only conclude
that (with some vagueness as to what constitutes an effort) this must be regarded as
impossible. It will be found to follow that three are, besides perceptual judgments,
original (i.e., indubitable because uncriticized) beliefs of a general recurrent kind,
as well as indubitable acritical inferences. (EP2: 348)
20 One  might  find  it  odd  to  group  such  suspiciously  dubbed  “indubitable”  beliefs  and
inferences  together  with  our  more  straightforward  and  seemingly  less  objectionable
perpetual judgments. But in fact, Peirce thought of perceptual judgments as belonging to
our “original” set of beliefs precisely because they are “acritically indubitable.” That is to
say, what implicitly motivates us to classify a judgment as perceptual is precisely our
incapacity to defend ourselves from its forceful insistence – our incapacity to resist it or
withhold our assent to it. As Peirce writes in an unpublished manuscript, “I cannot doubt
that what seems to be before my eyes does so seem” (R598:9, c.1902). Similarly, most of us
cannot genuinely doubt, no matter how hard we try, non-strictly perceptual propositions
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such as “Fire burns the flesh,” “There is order in nature” (CP 5.508), “I am not alone in the
universe” (R598:10), and “On the whole, memory is trustworthy” (R598:9).”13
 
3. The Basis of Pragmatism in the Doctrine of
Common Sense
21 I have argued that Peirce’s focus on the notion of self-control expresses his desire to
question,  rather than endorse,  the idea that the validity of  an inference (or belief)  is
directly proportional to the degree of self-control under which it can be performed. This
conclusion  does  not  intend  to  minimize  the  crucial  role  played  by  fully  deliberate
processes  in  rational  conduct.  To  the  contrary,  it  follows  from  a  more  detailed
examination of the nature and conditions of such processes. As Peirce points out, “the
theory of Pragmatism was originally based, as anybody will see who examines the papers
of November 1877 and January 1878, upon a study of the experience of the phenomena of
self-control which is common to all grown men and women” (EP2: 348). As we read in
another manuscript:
My original exposition of pragmatism, which those who seek to depreciate it limit
to one article in the Popular Science Monthly of January 1878, although I have […]
protested to  each one of  them personally  that  the argument is  incomplete  and
insufficient  without  the  article  of  November  1877  in  the  same  journal  [“The
Fixation of Belief”] […] – in this original exposition, I laid down, in the very first
place,  the doctrine of Common Sense;  namely,  that there are some propositions
that a man, as a fact, does not doubt; and what he does not doubt, he can, at most,
make but a futile pretense to criticize.” (EP2: 432-3)
22 Curiously, “The Fixation of Belief” (hereafter Fixation) contains only one explicit reference
to “common-sense,” and a negative one for that matter. And on a first reading of that
essay, there is no trace of anything that might resemble an exposition or defense of the
“doctrine of common-sense.” Was Peirce thinking of another of his early papers? Given
the detailed referencing in the foregoing passage, this would be implausible. As it turns
out, a closer reading of the first part of Fixation enables us to make sense of Peirce’s later
remark.
23 The negative reference to common sense occurs at the end of a preliminary section on
the nature and function of reasoning, at the apex of which we read: “A moment’s thought
will show that a variety of facts are already assumed when the logical question is first
asked.” The normative question about how we ought to reason incorporates within itself
many implicit assumptions:
It is implied, for instance, that there are such states of mind as doubt and belief –
that a passage from one to the other is possible, the object of thought remaining the
same, and that this transition is subject to some rules by which all minds are alike
bound. As these are facts which we must already know before we can have any clear
conception of reasoning at all,  it  cannot be supposed to be any longer of much
interest to inquire into their truth or falsity. (EP1: 113)
24 What would be the point of reasoning about (the truth or falsity of) that which must be
presupposed by  all  reasoning?  Notice,  however,  that  Peirce  is  not  arguing  from  the
“indispensability” of these facts to their incontrovertible truth. He is merely saying that,
because we have to assume them in order to engage in any form of normative reasoning at
all, it would be pointless to inquire into whether or not we ought to regard them as true.
Besides it doesn’t follow, from the fact that an inquiry into their truth cannot be “any
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longer of much interest,” that these assumptions are uninteresting or insignificant in
themselves:
On the other hand, it  is easy to believe that those rules of reasoning which are
deduced from the very idea of the process [those rules which can be derived from
the above-seen assumptions about the process of inquiry] are the ones which are
the most essential; and, indeed, that so long as [reasoning] conforms to these it will,
at  least,  not  lead to false conclusions from true premisses.  In point  of  fact,  the
importance of what may be deduced from the assumptions involved in the logical
question turns out to be greater than might be supposed […]. (EP1: 113)
25 Whether or not the constitutive assumptions of normative reasoning are metaphysically
correct, they are highly significant in their own right. Indeed, “it is easy to believe” that
the guiding principles (“rules of reasoning”) deduced by them are the safest and “most
essential.” Peirce’s “Illustrations of the Logic of Science” considered as a whole, so far as I
can  understand,  are  precisely  an  attempt  to  show “the  importance  of  what  may be
deduced”  from  the  constitutive  assumptions  of  normative  reasoning.14 At  any  rate,
presumably the first part of such “deduction” would have to consist in the articulation of
those constitutive assumptions. Accordingly, the last preliminary section of the Fixation
contains a discussion of the correlative notions of doubt and belief.
26 First, Peirce observes, “we, know when we wish to ask a question and when we wish to
pronounce a judgment” in virtue of a “dissimilarity between the sensation of doubting
and that of believing.” But there is also a “practical” difference between doubt and belief,
in that “the feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established
in our nature some habit which will  determine our actions. Doubt never has such an
effect.” Finally, a third point of difference is that “Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied
state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; while the
latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid” (W3: 247). In short,
belief and doubt (1) are indicated by different sensations, (2) involve the presence and
disruption  of  habits,  and  (3)  are  coeval  with  experiences  of  satisfaction  and
dissatisfaction.
27 It is only after the foregoing considerations that we find what we might regard as the
actual introduction to the main bulk of Fixation. Peirce begins this new paragraph with
the well-known claim: “the irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief.
I shall term this struggle inquiry […] That the settlement of opinion is the sole end of
inquiry is a very important proposition” (W3: 247). Notice however that this proposition,
which amounts effectively to a preliminary characterization of  “the very idea of  the
process” of normative reasoning (and which motivates and sets the tone for the rest of
Fixation and the other “illustrations”), follows entirely from the preceding articulation of
“those facts which are already assumed when the logical question is first asked” – in
particular,  our  common  sense  understanding  of  doubt  and  belief.  Only  on  the
“assumption” that doubt is “an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to
free ourselves and pass into the state of belief” does it make sense to define inquiry as
aiming exclusively at the “settlement of opinion.”
28 It follows that “the mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not
stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There must be a real and living doubt, and
without this all discussion is idle” (W3: 248). But in order for us to be able to translate
such doubts  into  normative  questions  –  questions  about  how we  ought  to  go  about
satisfying our doubts – we must be able to start from equally “real and living” beliefs –
not only perceptual judgments, but more generally all those acritically indubitable beliefs
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which make up our habitual and unproblematic, practical orientation to the world or
“readiness to act.” Without such a-critical orientation we could never experience any real
and living doubt, because the latter consists precisely in the privation of one or more of
those habits which (used to) make up the former. In other words, living doubts and thus
truly  critical questions  can  be  experienced  and  pursued  only  in  virtue  of  acritically
indubitable  beliefs.  Peirce’s  oxymoronic  expression  “Critical  Common-sensism,”
according to this interpretation, captures the paradox represented by such reciprocal
entailment between critical suspicion and practical conviction.15
29 This concludes my explication of Peirce’s retrospective remark to the effect that Fixation
includes, “in the very first place,” a defense of “the doctrine of Common Sense; namely,
that there are some propositions that a man, as a fact, does not doubt; and what he does
not doubt, he can, at most, make but a futile pretense to criticize.” Such propositions, as
we have seen, are not only necessary but also sufficient conditions for engaging in any
form  of  rational  inquiry.  As  Peirce  writes,  “an  inquiry  […]  has  only  to  start  with
propositions perfectly free from all actual doubt. If the premisses are not in fact doubted
at all, they cannot be more satisfactory than they are.” (W3: 248).
 
4. Motivational vs. Truth-directed Accounts of Belief
30 Of course, Peirce’s “doctrine of common sense” is deeply at variance with a recognizable
strain of modern philosophical common sense. According to the latter, not only some
propositions are indeed a good deal more satisfactory than those, if there are any, which
we cannot help believing or inferring; but also, and relatedly, no cognitive attitude should
be classified as an instance of “belief” unless it can be endorsed on the basis of clearly
identifiable  grounds.  And  in  fact,  as  Peirce  writes  in  the  above  mentioned  negative
remark, “common-sense, or thought as it first emerges above the level of the narrowly
practical, is deeply imbued with that bad logical quality to which the epithet metaphysical 
is commonly applied” (W3: 246). Peirce’s doctrine of common sense was an attempt to
clear up the “metaphysical” quality of those so-called “critical” habits of mind which
raise above the level of the narrowly practical.16 But is Peirce’s attempt successful? Does it
actually provide us with a more satisfactory account of rational inquiry?
31 Since Peirce’s pragmatist conception of inquiry is based on his account of belief, we may
reasonably assume the validity of the former to be dependent on the latter. And Peirce
himself is quite explicit about that not only in Fixation,  but also in many of his later
remarks  –  central  among  which  we  find  the  well-known  acknowledgment  that
“pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary” of Alexander Bain’s definition of belief as
“that upon which a man is prepared to act” (EP2: 399). On a first approximation, however,
this definition sheds relatively little light on the distinctive nature of belief. All it says is
that  there  seems  to  be  a  necessary  connection  between  believing  that  p and  being
disposed (“prepared”) to act in light of p. But, as Peirce would be the first to point out,
merely assuming something for the sake of argument is also connected to the practice of
(theoretical) inquiry. And yet, there are important differences between the attitudes of
believing and assuming a proposition.17
32 One might argue that a hypothesis can lead us to perform an experimental test only in
conjunction with beliefs – concerning,  for instance,  the epistemic worth of the given
hypothesis within the overall economy of inquiry. We could thus conclude that while
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believing, assuming, imagining, etc., are all different ways of accepting a proposition, or
regarding it as true, belief is distinguished by other cognitive attitudes as the only kind of
acceptance which has the power actually to motivate us to act. Of course, beliefs can lead
us to act only under the realization of various other conditions, such as the presence of
relevant  desires  and  requisite  motor  skills.  But  the  point  of  Bain’s  definition,  if
interpreted so as to indicate the distinctive nature of belief,  is that belief is the only
condition for motivation which is both cognitive (as opposed to factual or conative) and
necessary.
33 According  to  the  foregoing  “motivational” conception  of  belief,  as  David  Velleman
explains, “all that’s necessary for an attitude to qualify as a belief is that it dispose the
subject to behave in ways that would promote the satisfaction of his desires if its content
were  true.  An  attitude’s  tendency  to  cause  behavioral  output  is  thus  conceived  as
sufficient to make it a belief.” (Velleman 2000: 255).18 For instance, if the content of my
propositional attitude is “there is enough gas in the car to get home without refueling,”
and I have a desire to get home as soon as possible, that attitude qualifies as belief insofar
as it disposes me, in conjunction with this desire, to drive home without stopping at a gas
station. The belief may be false, of course, in which case it won’t allow me to satisfy my
desire to get home early. But all that is required by the motivational conception is that it
would  enable  me to  satisfy  desires  if  its  propositional  content  were  true.  What  this
conception doesn’t require is  that  beliefs  be defined as  being “truth-directed” in any
strong or non-tautological sense of that expression, as I will shortly explain.
34 Admittedly, this conception of belief has much in common with the pragmatist view of
the relationship between belief and truth. William James, for instance, defined truth as
“whatever proves to be good in the way of  belief” (James 1919:  42),  which seems to
presuppose that belief can indeed be defined prior to and independently of the concept of
truth.  The  latter  is  something  that  “happens to  an  idea,”  as  he  also  wrote. Besides,
conceiving of beliefs (or ideas) exclusively in terms of “behavioral output” seems a crucial
step toward questioning what is viewed by many pragmatists as the unduly privileged
status that has been traditionally accorded to the concept of (truthful) representation, by
reinserting this concept within the broader experience of finding something to be good,
useful, or satisfactory (in the broadest sense of these terms). Finally Peirce himself, after
giving the above-seen definition of inquiry,  emphasizes the superfluity of the idea of
truth when it comes to defining the aim of inquiry. He writes:
The sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not
enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put
this  fancy  to  the  test,  and  it  proves  groundless;  for  as  soon as  a  firm belief  is
reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. […] The most
that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But
we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say
so. (W3: 248)
35 As Velleman points out, in bearing this tautological relation to the notion of truth, “belief
is just like any other propositional attitude, since wishing entails wishing something to be
true, hoping entails hoping something to be true […] Hence the fact that believing entails
believing-true doesn’t set belief apart from other attitudes.” (Velleman 2000: 247). 
36 By contrast, Velleman favors a conception of belief whose constitutive relation to the
truth  does  actually  set  it  apart  from  other  cognitive  as  well  as  conative  attitudes.
Believing,  on  his  account,  does  not  merely  amount  to  accepting  a  proposition  or
regarding it as true, but accepting or so regarding it “with the aim of thereby accepting a
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truth” (Velleman 2000: 252), where “an acceptance has the aim of being the acceptance of
a truth when it is regulated […] in ways designed to ensure that it is true.” This is what
can explain, among other things, the difficulty of believing at will. While (a) assuming or
(b) imagining a proposition to be true involves accepting a proposition for the sake of
argument, or regardless of whether or not it is, in fact, true, (c) believing a proposition
does not come that easy. The reason, according to Velleman, is that the aim with which
we accept a proposition whenever we believe it is precisely the aim of (c) getting its truth
value right, “by regarding the proposition as true only if it really is” (Velleman 2000: 252).
And the success conditions of such an aim are more restrictive than those which are
involved in the aims of (a) considering the validity of a certain argument or, say, (b)
exploring the imaginary limits of our cognitive faculties.
37 Velleman’s  “truth-directed”  conception  implies  that  belief  cannot  be  characterized
exclusively by reference to its motivational role. In order for a cognitive attitude to be
classified as an instance of belief, it is not enough for it to motivate us to act. It must also
at  the  same  time  regulate our  behavior  “in  ways  designed  to  ensure”  that  its  own
propositional  object  is  true  –  even though,  as  Velleman is  careful  to  point  out,  our
regulatory mechanisms are neither infallible (which accounts for the fact that our beliefs,
as opposed to imaginings, can indeed be mistaken) nor do they need to operate in any
overtly intentional or self-conscious way. 
38 Accordingly,  the  main  thrust  of  Velleman’s  argument  consists  in  showing  why  the
capacity to dispose a person to act is not, after all, a distinctive feature of belief. As he
persuasively  argues,  only  by  “smuggling”  truth-directedness  into  their  motivational
account can philosophers deceive themselves into thinking that motivation is sufficient
to characterize belief. For instance, if Bain’s above seen definition as “that upon which a
person is prepared to act” seems to capture the most characteristic aspect of belief, it is
because we tend to regard “action” as a synonym of realistic or goal-pursuing action –
action oriented toward the satisfaction of  realistic goals in virtue of  “truth-directed”
cognitions about the means that are necessary to pursue them. By so doing, however, we
are led to interpret all instances of self-conscious behavior as being similarly realistically
motivated. But that is clearly a mistake not only with respect to the widespread
(especially among young children) phenomenon of make-believe, which is less a case of
“purposeful simulation” of a wishful scenario than acting it out of one’s imagination, but
also with respect to such “adult” behaviors as talking to ourselves and expressing our
emotions through “body-images” (scratching our head when we are puzzled, clenching
our fists in anger, yelling at the referee of a match we are watching on television, etc.). 
39 In all these cases, as Velleman points out, “imagining can be characterized as having the
same  conditional  disposition  as  belief;  the  only  differences  have  to  do  with  the
satisfaction of the associated conditions.” For instance,  unlike ordinary beliefs,  “most
deliberate imagining is accompanied by countervailing beliefs” which “exert their own
motivational force,” competing “with that of the subject’s imagination” (Velleman 2000:
272).  Thus,  after  yelling  at  the  television,  we  don’t  yell  louder  because  the  referee
couldn’t hear us. And when talking to ourselves, we usually lower our voice. Now, “the
fact  that  we talk to ourselves under our breaths suggests that the inhibition against
unrealistic motivation is selective: it prevents behavior that would be inconvenient or
self-destructive,  but  it  permits  behavior  that  is  harmless,  despite  being  unrealistic”
(Velleman 2000: 265).
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40 As it turns out, Peirce’s conception of the aim of belief is not far from Velleman’s. While
pragmatism might  be  superficially  characterized as  promoting  a  purely  motivational
conception of belief, there are at least two facts which countervail this impression when
it comes to Peirce’s account of inquiry. In the first place, theoretical inquiry does on his
account have a distinctive aim – one which, as I have argued in the previous section,
derives from Peirce’s reflection on the constitutive assumptions of normative reasoning,
especially the idea that a belief cannot fully realize itself without finding repose in a sort
of doubt-free state of “fixation.” 
41 Furthermore,  the  classical  pragmatists  as  a  whole  were  quite  sympathetic  to  the
observation  that  ideas  or  propositions  are  never  simply accepted  –  entertained,
contemplated, etc. They are always accepted from a certain perspective, within a certain
context, and for the sake of a more or less vaguely conceived purpose, where the aim of
“fixation” or stability is only one among others. Thus, while I can entertain the idea of
“being taller than I really am” for a variety of different purposes, I cannot believe this
proposition,  namely accept  it  with the aim of  thereby accepting a  thoroughly stable
opinion.  In  order  to  do  so,  I  would  have  to  develop an  attitude  toward  it  which  is
unsettled  by  competing  considerations  –  which,  in  this  case,  are  made  too  plainly
available by the believed proposition itself.
42 Finally, as I will argue in the next section, Peirce constantly emphasized the essential role
of imagination in any form of intentional conduct.19 In particular, he was interested in
what he thought to be an irreducible connection between imagination and theoretical
inquiry. After exploring this connection, we will be able to answer the question of how
Peirce’s  conception  of  belief  differs  from  Velleman’s,  and  why  this  difference  is  so
significant.
 
5. The Role of Imagination in the Formation of Belief
When a man desires ardently to know the truth, his first effort will be to imagine
what that truth can be. […] there is, after all, nothing but imagination that can ever
supply him an inkling of the truth. He can stare stupidly at phenomena; but in the
absence of imagination they will not connect themselves together in any rational
way. […] It is not too much to say that next after the passion to learn there is no
quality so indispensable to the successful prosecution of science as imagination. (CP
1.46-7)
43 This intuition is intimately related to Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, which he defined as the
“method” of tracing out “in the imagination the conceivable practical consequences, –
that is, the consequences for deliberate, self-controlled conduct – of the affirmation or
denial of the concept” (4.6) which is to be clarified. While we might already be familiar
with a given concept or proposition,  the only way to make our vague ideas about it
clearer (the only way to turn the concept into a conception, as we might also say) is to
imagine ourselves believing or doubting (affirming or negating) that proposition within
various conceivable circumstances and, on this basis, determine what habits of action we
ought to endorse, modify, or discard. 
44 Now, if we can engage in this kind of deliberate imagination of a belief’s practical
bearings, it is because belief is a habit of thought which is already to some extent “active
in the imagination” – whereby clarifying it through the pragmatic maxim consists in
further articulating its imaginary (“conceivable”) implications. Peirce explains this point
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by drawing a contrast between the habit of “putting my left leg into my trouser before
the right” and a belief-habit such as that fire is dangerous. If I have the first kind of
habits, “when I imagine that I put on my trousers, I shall probably not definitely think of
putting the left leg on first. But if I believe that fire is dangerous, and I imagine a fire
bursting out close beside me, I shall also imagine that I jump back.” (CP 2.148). That is to
say, while I may or may not be able to remember (imagine) the structure of my seemingly
“automatic” or compulsive habits of conduct, a person simply cannot be said to believe
anything or have an intellectual habit unless the imagination of relevant circumstances
didn’t prompt the imagination of the appropriate inferential conclusions. Imagination, in
this  sense,  is  an essential  ingredient  of  all  beliefs  –  it  is,  indeed,  “what  particularly
distinguishes” it from other kinds of habit. 
45 Of course, defining belief in terms of the imagination’s role in its formation, operation,
and explication does not yield an answer to Velleman’s question about what distinguishes
belief, not only from other kinds of habit but also from other cognitive attitudes such as
assumption  and  imagination  itself.  Perhaps,  however,  if  belief  cannot  be  defined
independently  of  imagination,  neither  might  we  be  able  to  understand  the  latter
independently of the former.
46 This may seem counterintuitive. Aren’t we capable of imagining and (to some extent at
least) acting upon things which we know to be utterly fantastic? There is no doubt about
that. But the question is precisely what is it that we are doing whenever we engage in the
activity of imagining things irrespectively of what we know (believe) to be the case. One
possibility, in light of the foregoing, is to think of “mere” imagination as a kind of wishful
laboratory for the formation and clarification of beliefs. According to this assumption, a
child who make-believes to be a mother is exploring the limits and possibilities of that
fictional world which surrounds her and is in several ways related to the actual world by
which she is nonetheless aware to be constrained. A person who talks with herself may be
going through the inherently dialogical process of making up her mind upon something.
After  all,  “thinking always proceeds in the form of  a  dialogue –  a  dialogue between
different phases of the ego – so that, being dialogical, it is essentially composed of signs”
(CP 4.6). Finally, many of our non-communicative gestures may express nothing more (or
less) than a somewhat ironical and self-defeating attempt to enact and defend ourselves
from the impenetrability of our emotions.
47 This is not to say that all our imaginings are realistically motivated. On the one hand, our
most realistic pursuits can never do without imagination, because they rely upon it for
the formation and maintenance of the habits by which they are to be governed. On the
other hand, imagination is not the thoroughly boundless activity we conceive it to be.
Even our most purely “wishful” forms of thought (imaginings motivated by cravings for
things we know or assume to be unattainable)  usually entail  more than pointless  or
“atelic” play of thought. Writes Peirce:
It is a familiar experience to every human being to wish for something quite beyond
his present means, and to follow that wish by the question, “Should I wish for that
thing just the same, if I had ample means to gratify it?” To answer that question, he
searches his heart […] He makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram […] of
himself,  considers  what  modifications  the  hypothetical  state  of  things  would
require to be made in that picture, and then examines it, that is, observes what he
has imagined, to see whether the same ardent desire is there to be discerned. (CP
2.227)
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48 This passage seems to conflate realistic and unrealistic conations (desires and wishes).
And yet, Peirce is here pointing to a more fundamental distinction: that between a trivial
wish (or desire) and an ardently felt, self-identifying one. As we need imagination for
clarifying an idea of which we have but a vague understanding, similarly do we need it to
determine the actual significance of what might initially appear as a trifling whim.
49 Of course, one might construe the foregoing example as resulting from the intersection of
two  quite  independent  phenomena:  a  “mere”  wish  and  a  normative  question  as  to
whether or not we should endorse it as expressive of who we aspire to be. However,
notice how “naturally” this question tends to follow from such wishful representations.20
Consider another example: I may fancy to become a well-known and highly esteemed
thinker.  And  yet,  I  could  not  even  begin  to  clarify  this  wishful  scenario  without
articulating some of the practical and normatively relevant differences its realization
would introduce in my life.  How would it change the way I work? Would it fulfill  or
exasperate my desire for recognition? In what respects would it make me happier or
better  as  a  person?  Would  it  humble  me  or  fuel  my  vanity?  Eventually,  a  more
determinate picture of that ideal would engage my normative attitudes of approval or
rejection, thereby influencing my self-controlled conduct on relevant occasions.21 
50 As Peirce puts it, “a mere imagination of reacting in a particular way seems to be capable
after numerous repetitions of causing the imagined kind of reaction really to take place
upon  subsequent  occurrences  of  the  stimulus.”  But  this  also  entails,  as  he  writes
elsewhere, that “no imagination is mere. ‘More than all that is in thy custody, watch over
thy phantasy,’ said Solomon, ‘For out of it are the issues of life’.” (CP 6.286). There is a sort
of unbroken development from the initial representation of a wishful scenario, passing
through the articulation and normative evaluation of its practical implications, to the
resulting shape of our motivational dispositions. If our wildest phantasies contribute to
the emergence and “fixation” of belief (whether trivial or about “the issues of life”), such
a tendency toward intellectual stability may be an essential ingredient of all imagination.
Peirce himself seems to gesture toward this conclusion in the following passage:
There must be some degree of steadiness in this imagination, or else we could not
think about and ask whether there was an object having any positive suchness. Now
this  steadiness  […]  consists  in  this,  that  if  our  mental  manipulation  is  delicate
enough, the hypothesis will resist being changed. Now there can be no resistance
where there is nothing of the nature of struggle or forceful action. (CP 1.322)
51 That is  to say,  either there is  such a degree of  steadiness in our imagination,  which
implies a struggle however slight with something other than our imagining attitude, or
there is nothing at all that we are imagining. And it is not just the initial formation of the
imaginary  hypothesis  that  entails  this  irreducibly  dual  experience  of  struggle  and
resistance. It is also our subsequent manipulation of the hypothesis that may lead us to
become genuinely surprised by the effects of our mental experiments.22
 
6. Peirce’s Account of the Aim of Belief
52 The foregoing discussion of the nature of imagination and its constitutive role for belief-
formation enables us to cast new light on the question concerning the distinctive nature
of belief. As we have seen above, Peirce’s conception is similar to Velleman’s when it
comes to the idea that belief must have something like a constitutive aim. At the same
time, it involves a possibly different understanding of such an aim. In some cases, the
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difference points to nothing deeper than a difference of perspectives. As Peirce writes in
Fixation, “The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a dissatisfaction at
two repugnant propositions. But here already is a vague concession that there is some one
thing which a proposition should represent.” (EP1: 120).23 Conversely, the persuasion that
truth-directedness  alone  enables  us  to  explain  the  impossibility  of  believing  at  will
reflects a concession to the reciprocal entailment between the truth and stability of our
intellectual dispositions.
53 But there is at least one category of beliefs with respect to which the issue is not merely
terminological.  That is the case of what Peirce dubs “acritically indubitable” beliefs –
judgments and inferences we cannot help making and acting upon, despite our inability to
grasp  their  rational  grounds  (whether  these  be  guiding  principles  governing  our
inferences  or  ideas taken  as  premises  of  our  judgments).  The  question  is  whether
Velleman’s truth-directed account would permit classifying such a-critical attitudes as
beliefs.  Now, insofar his  account depicts belief  as entailing a regulation “designed to
ensure” the truth of its propositional object, indubitable beliefs do not seem to be able to
fulfill this condition. Taking ‘believing to be right in regarding something as true’ as a
condition of belief sanctions the impossibility “believing” a proposition without grasping
its evidential grounds. If the notion of “fixation” is to characterize the distinctive aim of
belief, we cannot rely on Velleman’s idea of truth-directedness in order to explicate it. 
54 Now, Velleman argues that once we agree to think of beliefs as being “constitutively
regulated by input,” it follows as a conceptual implication of this normative picture that
truth and falsity are the requisite normative standards of belief. In other words, if beliefs,
in order to count as such, must not only generate output but also be regulated on the
basis of input, nothing but “truth” can be the aim toward which such a regulation is
actually  directed.  He writes:  “False  beliefs  are  necessarily  faulty  or  mistaken  […]
antecedently to and independent of any untoward practical consequences.” But now “the
fact  that  beliefs  are  conceived do be  faulty  when false  indicates  that  the  regulation
conceived to be constitutive of  them is  regulation for  truth.  Truth-directedness thus
appears to be enshrined in our [normative] concept of belief.” (Velleman 2000: 277-8). 
55 Yet one might grant this conclusion while wanting to unpack the concept of truth so as to
explain its intimate connection with belief. That is exactly Peirce’s strategy.24 If truth can
be properly regarded as the aim of belief, it is because all our belief-like attitudes aim at a
final and unconditional settlement. If a child is playing at being the mother of her baby
doll, she probably won’t care if you tell her that she is not enacting a truthful or objective
conception of motherhood. But she will be intrigued if we joined her game by playing in a
fundamentally  different  way,  thus  questioning  her  implicit  understanding  of  how  a
mother should treat her own baby. Whether or not a person has mastered the concept of
objective truth, her beliefs aim at that sort of stability which tends to be obstructed by
conflicting opinions – especially if these come from significant others. 
56 Indeed, as Peirce points out, a pragmatic clarification of the concept of truth, conceived
as the property of beliefs whose objects are real, leads us to conclude that “the only effect
which real things have is to cause [full-fledged or thoroughly stable] belief.” That is to
say, “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what
we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.” It follows
that  truth-directedness  is  “enshrined in  our  concept  of  belief”  only  in  virtue  of  the
conceptual mediation provided by the aim of a final, “predestined” settlement of opinion
(or intellectual satisfaction).25
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57 The  difference  between  rationally  grounded  and  indubitable  belief-habits  does  not
consist in the “aim” by which they are regulated, but in the greater role played by self-
controlled imagination in the formation and maintenance of the former. At the same
time, only by leading us to satisfy those doubts which have been able to unsettle our
otherwise stable mental  inclinations can our imaginative variations contribute to the
deliberate  formation  of  rationally  grounded  beliefs.  The  constitutive  aim  of  belief,
accordingly,  is  to  achieve  the  kind  of  intellectual  stability  which  is  already  vaguely
entailed  by  our  acritically  indubitable  beliefs.26 To  believe  something  amounts  to
accepting a proposition, or regarding it as true, with the aim of thereby establishing a
thoroughly stable habit of conduct.
 
7. Conclusion
58 The foregoing conclusion might seem to contradict Peirce’s insistence that our incapacity
to  doubt  a  proposition,  or  imagine  ways  in  which it  could  be  doubted,  cannot  be  a
conclusive reason for endorsing it.27 In light of the foregoing, however, we can draw the
following distinction. It is one thing conclusively to accept a proposition on the ground of
our incapacity to imagine how it could be false. Acknowledging a pervasive intellectual
inclination and, after having clarified it through the pragmatic maxim, relying upon it on
account of its continued insistence is quite another. As Peirce observes,
neither the philosophy of Common-Sense nor the man who holds it accepts any
belief on the ground that it has not been criticized. For […] such [acritical] beliefs are
not “accepted.” What happens is that one comes to recognize that one has had the
belief-habit as long as one can remember; and to say that no doubt of it has ever
arisen is only another way of saying the same thing. (CP 5.523)
59 It is the significance of this fact that Peirce was most interested in articulating.
60 In light of the foregoing, two ideas are worth emphasizing. There are certain (“acritically
indubitable”) beliefs which, regardless of whether or not they are in fact true, (1) give us
a  sense  of  what  any intellectual  habit  would have to  be  like  in  order  to  develop in
accordance with its natue telos. And, (2) insofar as they provide us with the very terms to
articulate our doubts, such beliefs constitute the “first premises” of all cognitive inquiry.
“This does not deny that what cannot be conceived today may be conceivable tomorrow.
But  just  as  long as  we cannot  help adopting a  mode of  thought,  so long it  must  be
thoroughly accepted as true” – hence trusted or relied upon. “Any doubt of it is idle
make-believe  and  irredeemable  paper.”  It  follows  that  when  Peirce  says  that  a
proposition which is not doubted at all cannot be more satisfactory than it is, he is not
being hyperbolic. He is pointing to the fact that we can develop no coherent idea of the
aim of inquiry in abstraction from those “perfectly self-satisfied” habits of action whose
“privation”  sets  us  in  “a  condition  of  erratic  activity  that  in  some  way  must  get
superseded by a [new] habit” (EP2: 336-7). Indeed, since those habits are “mostly (at least)
unconscious,” it is precisely in virtue of their interruption that we can become aware of
the kind of satisfaction at which we aim. 
61 Consequently, while the notion of “inconceivability” is problematic as a criterion of truth,
it is perfectly legitimate and indeed necessary as an element of its definition (at least when
it comes to the truth of necessary propositions). Writes Peirce in his Minute Logic (1902):
A reasonable  disputant  disputes  because  he  hopes  […]  that  both  parties  will  at
length find themselves forced to a common belief which will be definitive and final.
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For otherwise, why dispute? To reach a final and compulsory belief is, therefore,
what the reasonable disputant aims at. […] If, then, you can prove to him that a
necessary  proposition is  such that  there  will  be  a  final,  unshakable  compulsion
preventing him from imagining it to be false, you have proved to him that it has
those characters which he expresses by saying that the proposition is true. (CP 2.29)
Even  though  “the  history  of  science  teems  with  inconceivabilities  which  have  been
conquered,” the inconceivability of the opposite remains a definitive mark of the truth of
necessary propositions. Only, it is required “that ‘inconceivable’ should mean not merely
unrealizable  in  imagination  today  but  unrealizable  after  indefinite  training  and
education,” or eternally so. By implication, even though contingent propositions can be
imagined  to  be  false,  it  is  our  critically  endorsed  incapacity seriously  to  entertain
contrasting hypotheses that sets our belief-like attitudes toward those propositions apart
from others.
62 One might object that, regardless of whether or not Peirce actually held this conception
of belief, conceiving the latter as aiming at such a “compulsion” as would prevent us from
regarding it to be false is not only deeply unattractive but also inherently self-defeating.
While  I  cannot  fully  address  this  important  objection in a  few words,  I  want  to  say
something about the idea that aiming to “settle” our opinions would lead us to deceive
ourselves about their rational stability. Many people seem steadily attached to opinions
which would become unstable the moment they began asking questions about their own
meaning  and  implications.  How,  then,  can  aiming  at  a  final  compulsion  of  thought
prevent our beliefs from undermining their rational vocation? If, as the objection goes,
the aim of belief is supposed to explain their capacity to be “responsive to input,” fixation
seems exactly the kind of aim we would have to exclude from consideration. Either belief,
as I  conceive it,  is  irremediably self-defeating,  or we must have hit  upon a mistaken
conception of them.
63 As it turns out, Peirce seemed to be well aware of this kind of objection. This is what, in
my understanding,  actually motivated his ironical  selection of  the “methods” for the
fixation of belief. The first two methods – tenaciously clinging to our current beliefs and
regarding their validity as being dependent upon ratification of a cultural or political
authority – are based, at least in part, on the self-centered vices of laziness and fear. The
“method  of  science,”  by  contrast,  is  based  on  the  virtues  of  courage  and  selfless
dedication to an indefinitely  prolonged course of  experimentation.  The irony can be
expressed as follows: on the one hand, one could not find two attitudes more strikingly
opposed to each other than believing something out of fear, or laziness, and indefinitely
suspending one’s belief for the sake of scientific inquiry. On the other hand, and this is
the central point of Peirce’s argument (as I read it), both attitudes are rooted in a common
desire to “reach a final and compulsory belief” – whence it follows that the problem with
the first two methods does not consist in aiming solely at a conclusive settlement of
belief, but in not aiming at it passionately enough. What determines the failure of the first
two methods, as we might also say, is a lack of imagination: an incapacity to imagine ways
in which our belief-habit might break down under conceivable circumstances. But this, in
turn, derives precisely from a sort of unwillingness to believe – or, which amounts to the
same thing, from our willingness to settle for merely half-hearted or pretend beliefs.28
64 What deceives us into believing opinions which are genuinely doubtful is not our “will to
believe.” It is, on the contrary, our attempt to defend ourselves from such a thoroughly
wishful,29 and yet seemingly ineradicable impulse. It is this desire to believe that should
be seen as characterizing us as rational agents, namely as beings who can only fulfill their
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rational vocation by striving to act as they must. And there is no more effective and self-
deceiving way to defend ourselves from this drive toward “normative necessity” than
aiming to think as we feel we should, which, in Peirce’s classification, characterizes the
third “a priori” method for the fixation of belief. The problem with this method does not
consist  in  the  high respect  it  pays  to  the  “natural”  development  of  our  intellectual
inclinations. Rather, the problem consists in our characteristically modern inability to see
how such development can best  be served by loving the truth (what we are fated to
believe)  more  than  our  preconceptions  about  the  conditions  that  would  make  our
believing it rationally acceptable. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGLER David W., (2011), “Polanyi and Peirce on the Critical Method,” Tradition and Discovery: The
Polanyi Society Periodical, 38 (3), 13-30.
COLAPIETRO Vincent, (1999), “Peirce’s Guess at the Riddle of Rationality: Deliberative Imagination
as the Personal Locus of Human Practice,” in Sandra B. Rosenthal, Carl R. Hausman & Douglas R.
Anderson (eds.), Classical American Pragmatism: Its Contemporary Vitality, Urbana, University of
Illinois Press.
FABBRICHESI LEO Rossella, (2004), “Peirce and Wittgenstein on Common Sense,” Cognitio, 5 (2),
180-93.
FRIEDMAN Lesley, (1999), “Doubt & Inquiry: Peirce and Descartes Revisited,” Transactions of the
Charles S. Peirce Society, 35 (4), 724-46.
HAACK Susan, (1982), “Descartes, Peirce and the Cognitive Community,” The Monist, 65 (2), 156-81.
HOOKWAY Christopher, (2000), Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce, Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
HOOKWAY Christopher, (2012), The Pragmatic Maxim: Essays on Peirce and Pragmatism, Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
JAMES William, (1919 [1907]), Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Reprint, New
York, Longmans, Green and Co.
KASSER Jeffrey L., (2011), “How Settled are Settled Beliefs in ‘The Fixation of Belief’?,” Transactions
of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, 47 (2), 226-47.
LOEB Louis E., (1998), “Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce: On Securing Settled Doxastic States,” 
Noûs, 32 (2), 205-30.
MADDALENA Giovanni, (2010), “Peirce’s Theory of Assent,” Ideas in Action, Helsinki, Nordic Studies
in Pragmatism, 211-23.
MISAK Cheryl, (2016), Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Critical Reflection and Common-Sense Beliefs
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
17
PEIRCE Charles S., (1960), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Cambridge, Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
PEIRCE Charles S., (1982), Writings of Charles S. Peirce, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
PEIRCE Charles S., (1992), The Essential Peirce, Vol. 1, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
PEIRCE Charles S., (1998), The Essential Peirce, Vol 2, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
POGGIANI Francesco, (2012), “What Makes a Reasoning Sound?: C. S. Peirce’s Normative
Foundation of Logic,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American
Philosophy, 48 (1), 31-50.
POGGIANI Francesco, (2014), “Truth and Satisfaction: The Gist of Pragmaticism,” in Torkild
Thellefsen & Bent Sorensen (eds.), Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics,
Communication and Cognition (vol. 14), Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, KG.
POLLOCK Ryan & David W. AGLER, (2016), “Hume and Peirce on the Ultimate Stability of Belief,” 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97 (2), 245-69.
SHAH Nishi & James David VELLEMAN, (2005), “Doxastic Deliberation,” The Philosophical Review, 114
(4), 497-534.
SHORT Thomas L., (2000), “Peirce on the Aim of Inquiry: Another Reading of ‘Fixation’,” 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 36 (1), 1-23.
VELLEMAN James David, (2000), The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford, Clarendon.
VELLEMAN James David, (2004), “Replies to Discussion on ‘The Possibility of Practical Reason’,” 
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 121 (3), 277-98.
NOTES
1. I will discuss below one influential variant of this view, which, in contemporary
epistemology, goes by the name of “evidentialism.” Cheryl Misak is the most prominent
among Peirce’s scholars to propose an evidentialist reading of his conception of belief
(see Misak 2016).
2. This account of Peirce’s criticism of the Cartesian method is based on Susan Haack’s
pivotal study (1982).
3. “What is properly and usually called belief […] has no place in science at all” (CP 1.635;
RLT: 112).
4. Peirce defines a “criterion” as “a method of experiment by which something is
ascertained which is a sure indication of whether or not something different, and less
easy otherwise to find out, is true” (CP 2.29).
5. “The difficulty is that the opinions which today seem most unshakable are found
tomorrow to be out of fashion. They are really far more changeable than they appear to a
hasty reader to be.” (CP 5.382n).
6. Christopher Hookway (2000) has interpreted the “critical” nature of Peirce’s
endorsement of common sense along similar lines. He writes: “It thus seems that we
should try to doubt propositions that seem self-evident; and, even if they escape
criticism, we must allow that they could still succumb in the future. In these remarks we
find the germs of ‘critical’ common-sensism.” (Hookway 2000: 204). I will argue that, in
order to make sense of such critical emphasis without sinking back “into a Cartesian mire
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from which [Peirce’s] common-sensism was supposed to offer escape (209), such a “high
esteem for doubt” (5.514) should be placed within the broader context of Peirce’s
conception of belief. In other words, in order to understand what makes Peirce’s
philosophy of common sense critical, we must first come to terms with his esteem for
common sense beliefs. 
7. Cf. Kasser 2011.
8. As we shall see below, Peirce distinguishes between “acritical inferences” and
“associational suggestions of belief.” Since belief is itself, on his own account, a habit of
mind, the relevant difference might be more properly expressed as one between acts (as
opposed to attitudes): the act of judging x to be the case, without being aware of x’s
grounds, and the act of inferring x from y, without being aware of any relevant
inferential principle. In what follows, I will often use the term indubitable belief
somewhat loosely to indicate both acritical judgments and inferences. While the
difference between such acts does not have any immediate implication for my argument,
it fits nicely with the picture of self-control I will provide below, according to which self-
control is a matter degree of awareness of our beliefs’ normative grounds.
9. Evidence for this admittedly tentative interpretation of the connection between
pragmatism and critical common-sensism can be gathered by the following passage.
“That veritably indubitable beliefs are especially vague could be proved a priori. But proof
not being aimed at today, it will be simpler to say that the Critical Common-sensist’s
personal experience is that a suitable line of reflexion, accompanied by imaginary
experimentation, always excites doubt of any very broad proposition if it be defined with
precision. Yet there are beliefs of which such a critical sifting invariably leaves a certain
vague residuum unaffected.” (5.507).
10. This might sound surprising. Doesn’t the character of our “occult nature,” at least in
some important cases, emerge more clearly in those actions which are, so to speak,
brought about despite our effort to control them? Isn’t “who we truly are” more clearly
and honestly revealed by what we end up doing “when the chips are down,” regardless of
our previous deliberation on the relevant issues? But in fact, Peirce’s point is that there is
a much more intimate connection between human nature and self-control than we are
inclined to think. Of course, if by nature we mean whatever we are in abstraction from the
desire to act (or constitute ourselves) as we ought, Peirce’s remark does indeed sound
implausible. But given the often emphasized centrality of the idea of deliberative freedom
for an adequate understanding of human agency, it is that terminological stipulation
which should be questioned. Be that as it may, for the purpose of arriving at a more
accurate understanding of (practical) rationality, the most important anthropological
question is what to think of our “occult nature” once we acknowledge the primacy of the
deliberative perspective.
11. In a rejected manuscript page, Peirce explains: “It should be understood that
Common-sensism recognizes two classes of indubitable, which, because they are
indubitable, are uncriticizable. The one class consists of propositions of whose falsity one
cannot imagine any case. The other class consists of conscious determinations of one
belief by another, without any consciousness of any principle guiding the causation. Such
is St. Augustine’s Cogito, ergo sum. I do not call these reasonings, but I call them acritical 
inferences; for there has always been a tendency to use inference in a wider sense than 
reasoning. It is of the essence of reasoning to be reasonable, deliberate, self-controlled. To
that end, it must recognize and approve [its own guiding] principle. In acritical inference
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one is quite conscious that it is that which the premiss asserts which renders the
conclusion evidently certain or probable, as the case may be.” (R290:16x-17).
12. See De Civitate Dei, Book XI.
13. The important question remains as to what is it, specifically, that moves us to regard
only some of our indubitable beliefs as perceptual, as opposed to intellectual, volitional,
etc. But whatever the answer to that question, we cannot appeal to any more original
contact with reality than whatever is already afforded by the foregoing experience of
“brute” reaction. In the end, our sense that “perceptual judgments” are capable of
reflecting more directly the appearances of a reality which surrounds us might be due to
the cultural prevalence of a quite narrow or univocal conception of reality.
14. Christopher Hookway proposes a similar reading of Peirce’s Illustrations considered as
a whole (see Hoowkay 2000: 35).
15. My reading of Peirce, in this respect, is influenced by the epistemological insights of
Michael Polanyi. For a comparison between Pierce and Polanyi’s criticisms of the “critical
method,” see Agler 2011.
16. The purpose of this paper is not to give a full account of what makes Peirce’s
common-sensism critical. I rather want to show why Peirce’s critical common-sensism is 
not an attempt to strike a balance between Descartes’ method Thomas Reid’s philosophy
of common sense. On the one hand, a “mark of the Critical Common-sensist is that he has
a high esteem for doubt. He may almost be said to have a sacra fames for it. Only, his
hunger is not to be appeased with paper doubts: he must have the heavy and noble metal,
or else belief.” (CP 5.514). On the other hand, our capacity to distinguish between paper
and genuine doubts cannot be taken for granted. Part of the problem is that what might
appear as genuine doubts often result from inadequate common sense “critical”
presuppositions about the way in which we ought to think – this is, among other things,
what grounds the need for a truly critical approach to common sense.
17. For an insightful account of Peirce’s distinction between practical and theoretical
belief, see Hookway (2000: 21-43).
18. Velleman’s more sophisticated view, in Shah & Velleman 2005. I will focus on
Velleman’s original exposition because it is more immediately relevant to the purposes of
this essay.
19. The following account of the centrality of imagination in deliberate processes of belief
formation is deeply indebted to Vincent Colapietro’s influential work. See, for instance,
Colapietro 1999. 
20. T. L. Short reads Peirce in a similar vein: “Normative questions arise naturally, and
they are not reducible to questions of fact. They do not reduce to questions of fact,
because their resolution depends on human choice. But human choices, though they can
be arbitrary, cannot be sustained regardless of human nature or regardless of the nature
of the world in which we exist.” (Short 2000: 10).
21. “A mere imagination of reacting in a particular way seems to be capable after
numerous repetitions of causing the imagined kind of reaction really to take place upon
subsequent occurrences of the stimulus. In the formation of habits of deliberate action,
we may imagine the occurrence of the stimulus, and think out what the results of
different actions will be. One of these will appear particularly satisfactory; and then an
action of the soul takes place which is well described by saying that that mode of reaction
‘receives a deliberate stamp of approval.’ The result will be that when a similar occasion
actually arises for the first time it will be found that the habit of really reacting in that
way is already established.” (CP 5.538).
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22. See CP 5.567.
23. Consider also the following passage from Fixation: “what is more wholesome than any
particular belief is integrity of belief, and […] to avoid looking into the support of any
belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous”
(EP1: 123).
24. As Short points out, the strategy of Peirce’s argument, in Fixation, is to begin from
denying that “truth” has anything to do with the aim of inquiry only in order to “bring
out the basis on which we have made impersonal truth inquiry’s aim, and on which we
ought to continue doing so” (Short 2000: 9).
25. See Poggiani 2012 and 2014.
26. In this connection, Peirce writes: “It is easy to be certain – he writes – one has only to
be sufficiently vague.” (CP 4.237). For an excellent overview of the way in which Peirce’s
understanding of common sense beliefs relates to Wittgenstein’s, see Fabbrichesi 2004. Cf.
also Maddalena 2010.
27. For an insightful account of Peirce’s rejection of psychologism, see Hookway 2012.
28. This conclusion is consistent with, and partly inspired by, Lesley Friedman’s account
of Peirce’s critique of the Cartesian “psychological strategy necessary for suspending
those claims about which we have a firm conviction” (Friedman 1999: 725).
29. In this connection, it might be helpful to emphasize Peirce’s insistence that inquiry be
based on a “hope” that it will eventually achieve its purpose. And if inquiry can, in fact,
be motivated by nothing more substantial than such a hope, then perhaps we should
revise our common sense understanding of the relationship between hope and certainty.
See, for instance, CP 7.78. For an insightful account of Peirce’s “optimism” about the
objective of inquiry, see Loeb 1998. But cf. Pollock & Agler 2016. 
ABSTRACTS
I  explore  the  connection  between  pragmatism  and  common  sense  by  reflecting  upon  two
seemingly  contrasting  Peircean  remarks  about  the  pragmatic  method:  (a)  its  “basis  on  the
doctrine of common sense” and (b) the recommendation that a proposition p be explicated in
light of critical, deliberate, or “self-controlled” conduct ensuing from a belief that p. I show that
Peirce’s focus on phenomena of self-control is situated within his broader interest in the nature
of reasoning. The “secret of rational consciousness,” according to Peirce, does not consist in the
reflective or self-conscious nature of our most deliberate forms of conduct, per se, “as in the
review of the process of self-control in its entirety.” The rationality of an inference consists in its
capacity to restore the stability our “acritical” beliefs enjoyed before being unsettled by doubts.
On this view, Peirce’s pragmatic theory of rational inquiry as aiming at the fixation of belief
depends on a conception of belief as constituted by a tendency toward stability. In the rest of the
paper, I argue that this conception avoids the shortcoming of purely “motivational” accounts of
belief without denying this status of belief to our acritical intellectual dispositions – a denial
which is often implied by standard “truth-directed” accounts. 
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